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Abstract
With the alarming rate of security advisories and privacy
concerns on connected devices, there is an urgent need
for strong isolation guarantees in resource-constrained
devices that demand very lightweight solutions. However,
the status quo is that Unix-like operating systems do not
offer privilege separation inside a process. Lack of prac-
tical fine-grained compartmentalization inside a shared
address space leads to private data leakage through ap-
plications’ untrusted dependencies and compromised
threads. To this end, we propose µTiles, a lightweight
kernel abstraction and set of security primitives based
on mutual distrust for intra-process privilege separation,
memory protection, and secure multithreading. µTiles
takes advantage of hardware support for virtual mem-
ory tagging (e.g., ARM memory domains) to achieve
significant performance gain while eliminating various
hardware limitations. Our results (based on OpenSSL,
the Apache HTTP server, and LevelDB) show that µTiles
is extremely lightweight (adds ≈ 10KB to kernel image)
for IoT use cases. It adds negligible runtime overhead
(≈ 0.5%− 3.5%) and is easy to integrate with existing
applications for providing strong privilege separation.
1 Introduction
Many software attacks target sensitive content in an
application’s address space, usually through remote ex-
ploits, malicious third-party libraries, or unsafe language
vulnerabilities. Conventional operating systems consider
processes as units of isolation. However, particularly in
IoT use cases, most applications generate and analyze
highly sensitive data in a single process for efficiency rea-
sons. This leads to real threats (summarised in Table 1)
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Figure 1: High-level architecture of µTiles: it provides
strong intra-process isolation and privilege separation.
Each thread can define its own trust boundaries in the
form of µTiles that are protected memory regions. µTiles
are guarded against both untrusted code within the same
thread as well any untrusted threads.
that require effective protection against:
(i) an application’s secret data (e.g., private keys or user
passwords) can be leaked in the presence of compromised
third-party libraries like OpenSSL [22]; (ii) privileged
functions can be misused to access private content [21];
(iii) applications written in memory-safe languages such
as Rust or OCaml are vulnerable via unsafe external li-
braries that jeopardizes all other safety guarantees [6,33];
and (iv) in multithreaded servers attackers can exploit
vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows) so the compro-
mised thread can access sensitive data owned by other
threads [2]. This whole class of attacks could be avoided
by providing a practical way to enforce the least privilege
within a shared address space.
Process-based isolation is the primary compartmental-
ization technique for security-sensitive applications such
as OpenSSH to separate their components into different
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s CVE-2019-9345 Shared mapping bug 3
CVE-2019-9423 missing bounds check 3
CVE-2019-15295 unsafe third party library 3
CVE-2019-1278 unsafe third party library 3
CVE-2018-0487 unsafe third party library 3
CVE-2017-1000376 unsafe native bindings 3
CVE-2014-0160 Heartbleed bug 3
O
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CVE-2018-0497 SW side-channels
CVE-2017-5754 HW side-channels
Table 1: A representative selection of vulnerabilities that
cause sensitive content leakage. The attacks with a tick
can be mitigated by using µTiles protection.
processes [1, 3, 42]. However, this usually causes a large
overhead and requires redesigning an application from
scratch using a multiprocess architecture (e.g., Chrome)
that is impractical for most multithreaded applications
such as web servers. Previous work such as Privtrans [17]
and Wedge [16] provide automatic process-based isola-
tion of applications with a huge overhead (≈ 80%−40x
slowdown). Such systems’ impracticality is partially in-
herited from the conventional process abstractions such
as fork that already suffers from various efficiency and
security issues [13]. Even fork alternatives such as
clone, are not flexible enough for fine-grained data shar-
ing between processes for security-critical resources. We
need a better abstraction for shrinking the trust bound-
aries from inter-process to intra-process; so developers
can effectively prevent in-process attacks and build se-
cure multithreaded applications.
The importance of these security threats results in sig-
nificant improvement in hardware support for efficient
memory isolation [9, 11, 29, 50]. However, simple APIs
for utilizing such hardware features are not effective due
to the complexity of attacks as well as various hardware
limitations [40,47]. We need a more principled mitigation
approach. In particular, the requirements of real-world
IoT applications show a practicality gap in the existing
solutions (summarized in Table 2) that need to be cov-
ered.
In this paper, we present µTiles, a new OS abstrac-
tion for enforcing least privilege between threads and
on slabs of memory within the same address space. Un-
like previous work, µTiles security model allows each
thread to selectively protect or share its memory com-
partments both from the untrusted code within itself as
well as from any untrusted thread (see Figure 1). µTiles’
access control layer maps threads’ security policies to
µTiles dedicated virtual memory (VM) abstraction. This
VM manager provides an efficient memory tagging layer
Isolation mechanism Features
No compiler modification
Low hardware dependency
Flexible security policy
Simplicity/Usability
Low overhead
Unlimited isolated units
Multithreaded privilege separation
POSIX compatibility
Embedded device suitable
SFI/HFI [19, 44, 54] - G# - G# -  -  G#
Tagged-VMA/TLB [36, 40, 47]  - - G# G#  G#  -
LibOS [37, 41] G#  - G# G# - - G# G#
Process-based isolation [16, 17]   - G# - - -  G#
Capability hardware [50, 52] G# -  G# G#    -
DIFC-OSes [32, 51]    G# -  G# G# -
µTiles  G#        
 has the featureG# partially has the feature
- does not have the feature
Table 2: Overview of in-process isolation techniques. We
consider these metrics for our design, focusing on the
requirements of IoT use cases.
by bypassing most of the kernel’s paging abstraction.
It utilizes hardware-enforced VMA tagging (e.g., ARM
memory domains [11] or Intel MPK [29]) to achieve low
overhead. It should be noted that these hardware features
have various security and practicality limitations (§2)
that are mitigated by µTiles high-level abstraction. Our
contributions can be summarised as follows:
• present a new kernel’s security primitives based on
mutual-distrust for intra-process privilege separa-
tion. It provides strong protection of private content,
a secure multithreading model, and guarded com-
munication within a shared address space.
• describe how to utilize modern CPU facilities for
efficient memory tagging to avoid the overhead of
existing solutions (due to TLB flushes, per-thread
page tables, or nested page table management) while
relieving the hardware limitations.
• show that the solution is ultra-lightweight (≈ 5K
LoC) to be practical for embedded devices with a
minimal memory footprint.
• evaluate our implementation using real-world soft-
ware such as Apache HTTP server, OpenSSL, and
Google’s LevelDB, which shows µTiles add negligi-
ble runtime overhead for lightly modified applica-
tions while significantly improve their security by
strong compartmentalization.
The remainder of this paper elaborates on the hardware
features we use (§2), describes the architecture (§3) and
implementation of µTiles (§4), presents an evaluation
(§5) and finally the trade-offs of our approach (§6).
2
2 Goals & Assumptions
The µTiles abstraction aims to enforce thread-granularity
least privilege for memory accesses via the following
principles and assumptions on the underlying hardware.
2.1 Design Principles
Fine-grained strong isolation: All threads of execution
should be able to define their security policies and trust
models to selectively protect their sensitive resources.
Current OS security models of sharing (“everything-
or-nothing”) are not flexible enough for defining fine-
grained trust boundaries within processes or threads
(lightweight processes).
Performance: µTiles operations, including lunching,
running, changing access permissions, and sharing across
threads, should have minimal overhead. Moreover, un-
trusted (i.e., µTiles-independent) parts of applications
should not suffer any overhead.
Efficiency: µTiles should be lightweight to be practical
for embedded devices running on a few megabytes of
memory and slow ARM CPUs.
Compatibility: It is difficult to provide strong security
guarantees with no code modifications, and µTiles is no
exception. We move most of these modifications into
the Linux kernel (increasingly popular for embedded de-
ployments [5]) and provide simple userspace interfaces.
µTiles should be implemented without extensive changes
to the Linux and not depend on a specific programming
language, so existing applications can be ported easily.
To achieve effective isolation, we need a security
model based on mutual-distrust that lets each thread pro-
tect its own µTiles from untrusted parts of the same thread
as well as other threads and processes. Simply providing
POSIX memory management within µTiles (e.g. malloc
or mprotect) is inadequate. As a simple example, at-
tackers can misuse the API for changing the memory
layout of other threads’ µTiles or unauthorized memory
accesses. The µTiles interface needs (i) to provide isola-
tion within a single thread; (ii) to be flexible for sharing
between threads, and (iii) to restrict all unauthorized
permission changes or memory mappings modification
of allocated µTiles. Previous work such as ERIM [47]
or libMPK [40] does not offer such security guarantees
since their focus is more on performance and virtualiza-
tion of the hardware protection keys.
We derive inspiration from Decentralised Information
Flow Control (DIFC) [32] but with a more constrained
interface – by not supporting information flow within
a program, we avoid the complexities and performance
overheads that typically involves. Existing DIFC kernels
such as HiStar [51] achieve our isolation goals, but re-
quires a non-POSIX-based OS that makes it impractical
for many applications, particularly IoT use cases. To have
a practical and lightweight solution, we therefore built
µTiles by modifying the Linux kernel and additionally
utilizing modern hardware facilities for VMA tagging to
deliver low overhead.
2.2 HW-enforced VMA Tagging
Modern CPUs have supported memory protection mech-
anisms that are more efficient than traditional paging.
For example, VMA tagging features such as Intel Mem-
ory Protection Keys [29] and ARMv7 Memory Domains
(MDs) [11] provide fast isolation by reducing page ta-
ble walks and TLB flushes. Though the implementations
across Intel and ARM vary considerably (see Table 3),
µTiles high-level VM abstraction can securely utilize
these efficient building blocks while hiding their limita-
tions. In this paper, we primarily describe the design of
µTiles for ARMv7-A that is a widely used CPU in IoT
and mobile devices. Also, ARM-MD is a less flexible and
more challenging interface to support (§2.3) that covers
most MPK limitations as well.
As a summary of ARMv7-A memory management,
page table entries consist of a virtual base address, a phys-
ical base address, Address Space Identifier (ASID) tags,
domain IDs, and a set of flags for access control and other
page attributes. It supports a two-level hierarchical page
table when using a short-descriptor translation table for-
mat, and supports variable page sizes (1GB, 1MB, 64KB,
and 4KB). ARM supports two page tables simultane-
ously, using the hardware registers TTBR0 and TTBR1.
A virtual address is mapped to a physical address by the
CPU, depending on settings in TTBRC. This control reg-
ister has a field that sets a split point in the address space.
Addresses below the cutoff value are mapped through
the page tables pointed to by TTBR0 (used per process),
and addresses above the cutoff value are mapped through
TTBR1 (used by the kernel).
The translation tables hold a four-bits domain ID rang-
ing from D0 to D15. Access control for each domain
is handled by setting a domain access control register
(DACR) in CP15, which is a 32-bit register only acces-
sible in the privileged processor modes. Each domain
is assigned two bits in DACR, which defines its access
rights.
The four possible access rights for a domain are No Ac-
cess, Manager, Client, and Reserved (see Table 4). Those
fields let the processor (i) prohibit access to the domain
mapped memory–No Access; (ii) allow unlimited ac-
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Feature ARM Memory Domains Intel MPK
Per process domains 16 16
Access control register DACR (2 bits per domain, privileged register) PKRU (2 bits per domain, userspace register)
Access rights No-access, Full access, MMU default No-access, write-disable, MMU default
Paging modes 2-level paging (bits 8:5, level 1 entries) 4-level paging (bits 62:59 of PDPTE)
Address space privilege Privileged & usersapce Userspace only
Specific page fault Domain fault PK fault
Kernel virtual memory API No support Limited support (pkey_mprotect, pkey_alloc, pkey_free, and mmap)
Table 3: ARM memory domains vs Intel MPK: Despite being efficient building blocks of isolation, such features have
various limitations that µTiles abstraction resolves to provide effective intra-process privilege separation.
Mode Bits Description
No Access 00 Any access causes a domain fault.
Manager 11 Full accesses with no permissions check.
Client 01 Accesses are checked against the page tables
Reserved 10 Unknown behaviour.
Table 4: ARM memory domains access permissions
cess to the memory despite permission bits in the page
table– Manager; or (iii) let the access right be the same as
the page table permissions–Client. Any access violation
causes a domain fault. Changes to the DACR are low cost
and activated without affecting the TLB. Hence changing
domain permissions does not require TLB flushes.
2.3 Challenges of Utilizing ARM-MD
Though ARM memory domains are a promising primi-
tive in concept, the current hardware implementation and
OS support suffer from significant problems that have
prevented their broader adoption:
Scalability: ARM relies on a 32-bit DACR register and
so supports only up to 16 domains. Allocating a larger
register (e.g., 512 bits) would mean larger page table en-
tries or additional storage for domain IDs.
Flexibility: Unlike Intel MPK, ARM-MDs only apply
to first-level entries; the second-level entries inherit the
same permissions. This prevents arbitrary granularity of
memory protections to small page boundaries and re-
duces the performance of some applications [20]. Also,
the DACR access control options do not directly mark
a domain as read-only, write-only, or exec-only. So the
higher-level VM abstraction should resolve these issues.
Performance: Changing the DACR is a fast but privi-
leged operation, so any change of domain access permis-
sions from userspace require a system call. This is unlike
Intel MPK that makes its Protection Key Rights Register
(PKRU) accessible directly from userspace.
Userspace: There is no Linux userspace interface for
using ARM-MD; it is only used within the kernel to
map the kernel and userspace into separate domains. In
contrast, Linux already provides some basic support for
utilizing Intel MPK from userspace.
Security: Though the DACR is only accessible in priv-
ileged mode, any syscall that changes this register is a
potential breach that could cause the attacker to gain full
control1. Also, since only 16 domains are supported, it
is trivial to guess other domains’ identifiers, making it
essential to not expose these directly to application code.
3 µTiles
We now describe µTiles architecture, which is a kernel
abstraction for intra-process privilege separation with an
emphasis on strong isolation, performance, and practical-
ity for IoT use cases. µTiles abstraction contains three
primary kernel’s components for (1) access control and
least privilege enforcement, (2) threading and task man-
agement, (3) and dedicated virtual memory manager.
3.1 Threat Model
This paper focuses on two types of threats. First, memory-
corruption based threats inside a shared address space
that lead to sensitive information leakage; these threats
can be caused by bugs or malicious third-party libraries
(see Table 1). Second, attacks from threads that could get
compromised by exploiting logical bugs or vulnerabili-
ties (e.g., buffer overflow attacks, code injection, or ROP
attacks). We assume the attacker can control a thread in
a vulnerable multithreaded application, allocate memory,
and spawn more threads up to resource limits by the OS
and hardware. The attacker will try to escalate privileges
through the attacker-controlled threads or gain control
of another thread, e.g., by manipulating another thread’s
data or via code injection. The adversary may also bypass
protection regions by exploiting race conditions between
threads or by leveraging confused-deputy attacks.
µTiles thus provides isolation in two stages: (1) within a
1An occasion that has happened once already through the misuse
of the put_user/get_user kernel API (CVE-2013-6282)
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single thread (through utile_lock/unlock calls), and (2)
across threads in the same process. We consider threads
to be security principals that define their security policies
based on mutual-distrust within the shared address space.
We protect each thread’s µTiles against unauthorized, ac-
cidental, and malicious access or disclosure. Therefore,
the TCB consists of the OS kernel, which performs se-
curity policy enforcement. It also assumes developers
correctly specify their policies through the userspace in-
terface for managing µTiles.
µTiles are not protected against covert channels based
on shared hardware resources (e.g., a cache). Systems
such as Nickel [45] or hardware-assisted platforms such
as Hyperflow [24] could be a helpful future addition for
side-channel protection on µTiles.
3.2 Access Control Mechanism
Our modified Linux kernel enforces the principle of
least privilege via a dynamic security policy based on
DIFC [49, 51] and a simpler version of the Flume [32]
labeling with only two kernel objects that are thread and
address space. Any thread t has one secrecy(SLt) and
integrity label (ILt ) that each is set of unique tags. µTile
objects (e.i., contiguous units of memory) have only one
secrecy label instead of both types. The integrity viola-
tions are restricted in the higher-level by controlling the
flow of threads labels; this improves performance and
reduces complexity.
Privileges are represented in forms of two capabilities
θ+ and θ− per tag θ for adding or removing tags to/from
labels. These capabilities are stored in a capability list Cp
per thread p. Unique tags are assigned internally by the
kernel by calling utile_create. For improving security,
none of µTiles API propagates tags in the userspace; all
APIs access control is done internally within the kernel.
The kernel allows secrecy information flow from α to β
only if SLα ⊆ SLβ, and integrity flow if ILβ ⊆ ILα. Every
thread p may change its label from Li to L j if it has the
capability to add tags present in L j but not in Li, and can
drop the tags that are in Li but not in L j. This is formally
declared as (L j−Li ⊆C+p )∧ (Li−L j ⊆C−p ).
When a thread has θ+ capability for µTile θ, it gains
the privilege to only access µTile θ with only the per-
mission set by its owner (read/write/execute). The ac-
cess privileges to each µTile can be different; hence, two
threads can share a µTile, but the access privileges can
differ. Having a θ− capability lets a thread to declassify
µTile θ. The declassification allows the thread to mod-
ify the µTile memory layout (by adding/removing pages
to it), changing permissions, or copying the content to
untrusted sources. Unsafe operations like declassifying
µTiles or by endorsing a µTile as high-integrity require
the thread to be an owner or an authority (acts-for rela-
tionship); which can be managed by utile_grant and
utile_revoke calls (see Table 5).
syscalls Description
utile_transfer_caps(u_in f o∗,tid) passing only plus capabilities to thread tid
utile_declassify(u_in f o∗) thread declassification or endorsement
utile_grant(u_in f o∗, tid) adds an acts-for or a delegation link to another thread
utile_revoke_grant(u_in f o∗, tid) removes an acts-for or a delegation link
utile_lock (u_in f o∗) disables access to set of µTiles
utile_unlock (u_in f o∗) enables access to locked µTiles
utile_clone (u_in f o∗,int(*fn)(void*)...)→ tid creates a thread
Table 5: µTiles access control system calls. tid repre-
sents a thread ID, struct u_in f o∗ is the owner list of
µTiles IDs and other fields for ownership management
and capabilities per µTile. There is no direct propaga-
tion of labels that are security-critical data structures, and
security policies are enforced within the kernel.
3.3 µTiles Threads
Each thread may have multiple µTiles attached to it.
There is no concept of inheriting credentials and capabil-
ities by default (e.g., in the style of fork) as this makes
reasoning about security difficult [13]. For a µTile to prop-
agate, it must be through transferring capabilities; this
can be done directly by calling utile_transfer_caps
for “plus” capabilities and utile_grant for declassifi-
cation or endorsement. Both these operations are also
possible via specific arguments of utile_clone syscall
when creating a child thread. Figure 2 shows how each
thread can use the µTiles API for creating tags, chang-
ing labels, and passing capabilities to other threads. For
instance, thread 2 gains access to µTile 18 by directly
getting the b+ capability from thread 1. Since it does
not have the b− capability, it cannot change µTile 18
permissions or its memory mappings.
It should be noted that µTile ID is not the same as
its label. All security-critical data structures for mang-
ing labels are stored inside the kernel, so they can not
be modified by userspace attackers. Table 5 describes
the userspace µTile API. Threads can lock access or per-
mission changes of their µTiles via utile_lock, which
temporarily change µTile tag to restrict any modifications
of µTiles state. A locked µTile can only be accessed by
calling utile_unlock.
A tagged thread can create a child by calling
utile_clone; the child thread does not inherit any of
its parent’s capabilities. However, the parent can create a
child with a list of its µTiles and selected capabilities as
an argument of utile_clone. For instance, in Figure 2,
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Thread 1
OS Kernel
µTiles Tags Caps
#21 (r/w)
#18 (r/o)
#46 (e/o)
a a+,a-
b b+,b-
c c+,c-
(child)Thread 3
µTiles API
Thread 2
µTiles API
µTiles Tags Caps
#18 (r/o)
#46 (e/o)
b b+
c c+
µTiles Tags Caps
#14 (r/w)
#26 (r/w)
#18 (r/o)
t t+,t-
d d+,d-
b b+
Userspace
utile_clone(label,…);   
µTiles Virtual Memory Managment
 & map_to_DACR[D0,…D15]
utile_mmap
utile_munmap
utile_mprotect
utile_alloc_tag();
utile_modify_label();
µTiles API
tra
nsf
er_
cap
s(b
+,…
);
Figure 2: µTiles threading abstraction: each thread is a security principal, it can define security policies for controlling
its µTiles collection, and pass its capabilities to other threads. The kernel enforces the security policies and handles
virtual memory management of µTiles.
thread 1 creates its child with only a “plus” capability to
two of its µTiles (18,46).
3.3.1 µTiles Memory Management
µTiles dedicated VM abstraction provides a familiar se-
mantics for µTiles-aware memory management, VM tag-
ging, mappings, protection, page faults handling, and
least privilege enforcement. It bypasses most of the ker-
nel’s paging abstraction. Hence, it does not require ex-
tensive modifications to the kernel memory manage-
ment structures that might otherwise introduce security
holes due to inevitable TLB and memory management
bugs [53]. Threads’ security policy enforcement is done
by adding custom security hooks in the VM interfaces
that check the correct flow of labels (§3.3).
To improve performance (§2.1), the VM abstraction maps
per thread’s high-level security policies and memory man-
agement interface to the underlying hardware domains
that also hide its limitations(§2.3). Example code 1 shows
a basic way of using µTiles to protect sensitive content
in a single thread.
An application creates a new µTile by calling
utile_create; the kernel creates a unique tag with both
capabilities (since it is the owner) and adds it to the
thread’s label and capability lists, and returns a unique ID.
Then the owner thread maps pages to its µTile by calling
utile_mmap that updates the µTile’s metadata with its
address space ranges. The kernel allows mappings based
on the thread’s labels and free hardware domains. If there
is a free hardware domain, it maps pages to that domain
and places it to µTiles cache. When the µTiles already
exists in the cache, further access to it is fast. When there
is no free hardware domain, we have to evict one of the
µTiles from the cache and map the new µTile metadata
to the freed hardware domain; this requires storing all
the necessary information for restoring the evicted µTile,
such as its permission, address space range, and label.
The caching process can be further optimized by tuning
the eviction rate and suitable caching policies similar to
libMPK [40].
/* create a utile */
int utile_id = utile_create();
/* map a memory region to the utile */
memblock = (char*) utile_mmap(utile_id,
addr, len, prot , 0, 0); //
// set permissions by utile_mprotect
/* allocate memory from utile */
private_blk = (char*) utile_malloc(
utile_id, priv_len);
/* make utile inaccessible */
lock_utile(utile_id);
//... untrusted computations ....//
/* make utile accessible */
unlock_utile(utile_id);
//... trusted computations ....//
/* cleanup utile */
utile_free(private_blk);
utile_munmap(utile_id, memblock,len);
Listing 1: Basic µTiles usage
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Name Description
utile_create→ id Create a new µTile
utile_kill(id) Destroy a µTile
utile_malloc(id,size)→void* Allocate memory within a µTile
utile_free(id,void∗) free memory from a µTile
utile_mprotect(id, ...) change an µTile’s pages permission
utile_mmap(id, ...)→void* Map a page group to a µTile
utile_munmap(id, ...) Unmap all pages of a µTile
utile_get(id)→perms Get a µTile permission
Table 6: Some of userspace µTiles memory management
API. Each µTile has an id and is a tagged kernel object
internally. µTiles access control is checked within the
kernel.
The application uses utile_malloc and the µTile
ID to allocate memory within the µTile boundaries
(utile_malloc), and utile_free to deallocate memory
or utile_mprotect to change its permissions; Table 6
shows the familiar API for µTiles memory management.
To mitigate attacks inside a single thread, unauthorized
access to µTile, by accident or other malicious code, are
restricted once the owner calls utile_lock. Then ap-
plication developer can allow only her trusted functions
or necessary parts of the code to gain access by call-
ing utile_unlock. For example, our single-threaded
OpenSSL uses this mechanism for isolating private keys
from vulnerabilities like Heartbleed bug §5.2).
The VM manager has a separate fault handler for µTiles-
specific cases. Illegal access to µTiles causes domain
faults that our handler logs (e.g., violating thread infor-
mation) and terminates it with a signal.
4 Implementation
µTiles Kernel Modifications: The µTiles access control
and the security model is implemented as a new Linux Se-
curity Module (LSM) [39] with only four custom hooks.
The LSM initializes the required data structures, such as
the label registry. Access control system calls (Table 5)
for enforcing least privilege are implemented as a part of
the LSM, including locking µTiles, transferring capabili-
ties, authority operations, and declassification based on
the labeling model we described(§3.3).
We modify the Linux task structure to store the meta-
data required to distinguish µTiles threads from regular
ones. Specifically, we add fields for storing µTiles meta-
data, label/ownership as an array data structure holding
its tags (each tag is a 32-bit identification whose upper 2
bits stores plus and minus capabilities), a capability list;
all included as a specific task’s cred->security data
structure. We implemented a hash table-based registry to
make mostly used operations (e.g., store, set, get, remove)
on these data structures more efficiently.
The LSM also provides custom security hooks for pars-
ing userspace labels to the kernel (copy_user_label),
labeling a task (set_task_label), checking whether
the task is labeled (is_task_labeled), and checking
if the information flow between two tasks is allowed
(check_labels_allowed). These security hooks are
added in various places within the kernel to guard µTiles
against unauthorized access or permission change by ei-
ther the POSIX API (e.g., mmap, mprotect, fork) or the
µTiles API. For example, forking a labeled task should
not copy its labels and capability lists, and this is enforced
using these security hooks. As another example, µTiles-
independent applications that using traditional POSIX
API can not perform any unauthorized memory alloca-
tion from a random µTile or mapping pages to it; this
is restricted via the security hooks that are placed in the
kernel’s virtual memory management layer similar to the
µTiles VM manager (Table 6).
The µTiles virtual memory abstraction is implemented
as a set of kernel functions similar to their Linux equiv-
alents (e.g., do_mmap, do_munmap and do_mprotect)
with similar high-level semantics but replaces the pag-
ing compexity with simpler hardware domain-based op-
erations. When an application creates a µTile by call-
ing utile_create and maps an address range to it
via utile_mmap, The µTiles VM manager tags a 1MB
aligned address space that covers the requested range,
stores µTiles metadata, maps it to a free hardware do-
main and updates the µTiles cache.
When µTiles are mapped to hardware domains, the exact
physical domain number is hidden from the userspace
code to avoid possible misuse of the API. The mappings
between µTiles and hardware domains are maintained
through a cache-like structure similar to libmpk [40]. A
µTile is inside the cache if it is already associated with
a hardware domain; otherwise, it evicts another µTile
based on the least recently used (LRU) caching policy
while saving all require metadata for restoring the µTile
mapping and permission flags.
µTiles owners (or authorities) can change their µTiles’
permission via utile_mprotect. This operation is faster
when the requested permission matches one of the do-
main’s supported options (Table 4) or undergo the over-
head of effecting TLB. Any violation of µTiles permis-
sions causes a µTiles fault that leads to the violating
thread being terminated.
Userspace: To reduce the size of the TCB, we did
not modify existing system libraries (e.g., glibc) and in-
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stead provided a small userspace library for µTiles op-
erations that summarized in Tables 5 and 6. As demon-
strated, the library supports a familiar API for memory
management within a µTile, including utile_malloc
and utile_free for memory management; which is
implemented as a custom memory allocator similar to
HeapLayer [15].This allocates memory from an already
mapped µTile. For each µTile, there is a memory domain
in-kernel metadata structure that keeps essential infor-
mation such as the µTile address space range (base and
length) and the two lists of free blocks from the head and
tails of the µTile region that is used when searching for
free blocks of memory.
5 Evaluation
We evaluated our implementation of µTiles on a Rasp-
berry Pi 3 Model B [4] that uses a Broadcom BCM2837
SoC with a 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53
processor with 32KB L1 and 512KB L2 cache mem-
ory, running a 32-bit unmodified Linux kernel version
4.19.42 and glibc version 2.28 as the baseline. We use
microbenchmarks and compartmentalize real-world ap-
plications to evaluate µTiles in terms of performance
and usability (§2.1 and §2.3) by answering the following
questions:
• What is the initialization and runtime overhead of
µTiles? How does utilizing hardware domains im-
pact performance?
• Are µTiles practical and adaptable for real-world
applications? How much application change and
programming effort is required? What is the perfor-
mance impact? How does it perform for hardening
a multi-threaded environment?
• What is the memory footprint of µTiles? Is it suit-
able for small IoT devices? How much memory
does it add (statically and dynamically) to both the
kernel and userspace?
5.1 Microbenchmarks
Creating µTiles: Table 7 tests the cost of creating and
mapping pages to µTiles using utile_mmap when µTiles
are directly mapped to hardware domains, as compared
to virtualized µTiles when there is no free hardware do-
main and requires evicting µTiles from the cache. The
results show that when there is a free hardware domain,
the performance improves by 4.9% compare to the virtu-
alized one. Note that creating µTiles is usually a one-time
operation at the initial phase of an application.
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Figure 3: Cost of µTiles memory allocation (malloc &
free). On average utile_malloc outperforms malloc
by a small rate (0.03%).
Operation Overhead stddev
Direct utile_mmap/munmap 4.8% +- 0.17%
Virtualised utile_mmap/munmap 10.01% +- 0.15%
Table 7: Cost of creating µTiles when directly mapped to
hardware domains vs virtualized mapping that requires
µTiles caching. The results show the average of 10000
runs.
Memory protection & allocation: Changing µTile
permissions and memory allocation operations in-
side µTiles have the most impact on runtime over-
head. We evaluated the performance comparison of
utile_mprotect vs glibc mprotect based on permis-
sion flags. Since hardware memory domains do not
have flexible access control options (§2.3), we cannot
benefit from a control switch of domains using the
DACR register for all possible permission flags such
as the RO, WO, and EO variants. Our results show
that on average utile_mprotect is 1.17x faster than
mprotect for no access (PROT_NONE) or RW permis-
sions (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE), but 1.3x slower
for read/write/execute-only options that are emulated.
Allocating memory using utile_malloc is on aver-
age 1.08x faster than glibc malloc for blocks ≤ 64KB
and introduces a small overhead (8.3%) for larger blocks
(> 64KB) as demonstrated in Figure 3. This cost can be
optimized by using high-performance memory alloca-
tors [34]. We report the average of running microbench-
marks 20000 times and show how utilizing µTiles pro-
vides small overhead for memory allocation and permis-
sion changes.
Threading: We tested the cost of µTile threading op-
erations (creating and joining) through utile_clone
that creates µTile-aware threads; utile_clone inter-
nally uses the clone syscall with minor modifications
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Figure 4: Overhead of creating µTiles-enabled threads:
the results are the average of 100000 runs with 1MB and
2MB heap sizes. On average, utile_clone latency is
5.39% lower than of pthread_create.
to restrict any credential sharing with the child by de-
fault (instead it provides additional clone options for
passing parent’s capabilities to its child). We imple-
mented utile_join similar to waitpid. Table 4 shows
utile_clone outperforms pthread_create by 0.56%
and fork by 83.01%. This gain is attributed to the
utile_clone simply doing less sharing for initializing
new threads.
Codebase overhead: Another factor towards the us-
ability of µTiles is the codebase size, which is important
both from a security perspective and the resource limi-
tations of small IoT devices. We implemented µTiles as
a Linux kernel patch with no dependency on any third-
party library. As Table 8 shows, it adds less than 5.5K
LoC in total to both the kernel (≈ 3K) and userspace
(< 2.5K). It adds 7KB to the kernel image size and adds
204KB for kernel slabs at runtime. The userspace library
only needs ≈ 10KB of memory. These results show that
the µTiles memory footprint is extremely low and suit-
able for many resource-constrained uses.
Overhead Linux Kernel Userspace
Added LoC 3023 2405
Static Memory footprint static(7KB) slab(204KB) Static(10KB)
Table 8: µTiles codebase size and Memory footprint in
the Linux Kernel and userspace
5.2 OpenSSL
OpenSSL is a widely used open-source library imple-
menting cryptography operations and the transport layer
security (TLS) protocol. It handles sensitive content
such as private keys and encrypted data. Hence it sig-
nificantly benefits from isolating its sensitive content
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Figure 5: Overhead of httpd on unmodified OpenSSL vs
µTiles-enabled one.
in separate compartments to mitigate information leak-
age attacks (e.g., Heartbleed). We modified OpenSSL
to utilize µTiles for protecting private keys from poten-
tial information leakage by storing the keys in protected
memory pages inside a single µTile or multiple µTiles
assigned per private key. Using multiple µTiles provides
stronger security while adding more overhead due to the
cost of caching µTiles.
To enable µTiles inside OpenSSL, all the data struc-
tures that store private keys such as EVP_PKEY needed
protected heap memory allocation. This meant replac-
ing OpenSSL_malloc wit utile_malloc and using
utile_mmap at the initialization phase for creating one
or multiple (per session) µTiles to store private keys.
After storing the keys, access to µTiles is disabled by
calling utile_lock. Only trusted functions that re-
quire access to private keys (e.g., EVP_EncryptUpdate
or pkey_rsa_encrypt/decrypt) can access µTiles by
calling utile_unlock. Modifying OpenSSL required
fairly small code changes, and added only 281 LoC.
We measured the performance overhead of µTiles-
enabled OpenSSL by evaluating it on the Apache HTTP
server (httpd) that uses OpenSSL to implement HTTPS.
Table 5 shows the overhead of ApacheBench httpd with
both the original OpenSSL library and the secured one
with µTiles. ApacheBench is launched 100 times with
various request parameters. We choose the TLS1.2 DHE-
RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 algorithm with 2048-bit
keys as a cipher suite in the evaluation.
The results show that on average µTiles introduces
0.47% performance overhead in terms of latency when
using a single µTile for protecting all keys, and 3.67%
overhead when using a separate µTile per session key. In
the single µTile case, the negligible overhead is mainly
caused by in-kernel data structure maintenance for enforc-
ing privilage separation and handling µTiles metadata. In
the multiple-µTiles case, since httpd utilizes more than 16
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µTiles (allocates a new µTile per session), it causes higher
overhead due to the caching costs within the kernel.
5.3 LevelDB
To show how µTiles can be used for hardening multi-
threaded applications, we modified Google’s LevelDB
that is a fast key-value store and storage engine used
by many applications as a backend database. It supports
multithreading for both concurrent writers to insert data
into the database as well as concurrent read to improve its
performance. However, there is no privilege separation
between threads, so threads can not communicate se-
curely with the database and protect their private content
from other threads. We modified LevelDB to evaluate
performance overhead of using the µTiles secure thread-
ing model when each thread has its own private storage
that cannot be accessed by other threads.
We replaced the LevelDB threading backend
(env_posix) that uses pthreads with µTiles-aware
threading, where each thread creates an isolated µTile
to protect its private storage and sensitive computations.
We used the LevelDB db_bench tool (without modifica-
tion) for measuring the performance overhead of µTiles.
We generate a database with 400K records with 16-
byte keys and 100-byte values (a raw size of 44.3MB).
The number of reader threads is set to 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and
32 threads for each successive run. The threads operate
on randomly selected records in the database. The results
in Figures 6 and 7 show how multithreading can improve
the performance of LevelDB, and utilizing µTiles adds a
small overhead on write (5%) and read (1.98%) through-
put. As with OpenSSL previously, modifying LevelDB
required only adding 157 lines-of-code around the code-
base.
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Figure 6: LevelDB: performance overhead of µTiles-
based multithreading compare to pthread-based in terms
of write throughput (5%).
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Figure 7: LevelDB: performance overhead of µTiles-
based multithreading compare to pthread-based in terms
of read throughput (1.98%).
6 Discussion
We have shown that µTiles provides a practical and ef-
ficient mechanism for intra-process isolation and inter-
thread privilege separation on data objects. However, the
mechanism can still be taken further.
6.1 Address Space Protection Limitations
For single-threaded scenarios (e.g., event-driven servers),
although µTiles can protect sensitive content from unsafe
libraries or untrusted parts of the applications, it can be
vulnerable if the untrusted modules are also µTiles-aware
and already use the µTiles APIs. The untrusted library
can use utile_get to query µTile IDs and use the API
to reach them. It should be noted that this is not an issue
for untrusted legacy libraries. Additionally, to remove the
possibility of such attacks, it is better to run these unsafe
libraries in a separate thread, which is isolated through
µTiles abstraction.
Various covert attacks [45] and side-channel attacks
such as Meltdown [35] and Spectre [30] demonstrate
how hardware and kernel isolation can be bypassed [28].
µTiles are currently vulnerable to these class of attacks,
although the existing countermeasures within the Linux
kernel are sufficient protection. We believe these types
of attacks are important security threats, and hardening
µTiles against them could be significant future work.
6.2 Compatibility Limitations
Providing a solution that is compatible with various oper-
ating systems and heterogeneous hardware is challenging.
Though we picked our base kernel on Linux and built the
abstraction with minimal dependencies, some application
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modification is still required. We believe that building
more compatibility layers into our existing userspace
implementation is possible. We are open-sourcing our
code with further feedback and patches from the relevant
upstream projects we have modified.
Although Linux is the most widespread general-
purpose kernel for embedded devices, many even smaller
devices depend on operating systems such as FreeR-
TOS. These often use ARM Cortex-M based hardware
features for isolation (such as memory protection units
(MPUs) [10, 46]), or more recent CPUs with memory
tagging extension [9]. We plan to explore the implemen-
tation of the µTiles kernel memory management on these
single-address space operating systems, as well as broad-
ening the port to Intel architectures on Linux (where the
memory domains support is generally simpler to use than
on ARM).
7 Related work
There are many software or hardware-based techniques
for providing process and intra-process memory protec-
tion.
OS/hypervisor-based solutions: Hardware virtualiza-
tion features are used for in-process data encapsula-
tion by Dune [14] by using the Intel VT-x virtualiza-
tion extensions to isolate compartments within user pro-
cesses. However, overall, the overheads of such hardware
virtualization-based encapsulation are much more heavy-
weight than µTiles, and not practical for IoT applications.
ERIM [47], light-weight contexts (lwCs) [36] and se-
cure memory views (SMVs) [27] all provide in-process
memory isolation and have reduced the overhead of sen-
sitive data encapsulation on x86 platforms. The µTiles ab-
straction provides stronger security guarantees and privi-
lege separation. It allows more flexible ways of defining
security policies for legacy code – e.g., within a single
thread as in our OpenSSL example. Its small memory
footprint makes it suitable for smaller devices, and it
takes advantage of efficient virtual memory tagging by
using hardware domains to reduce overhead.
Burow et al. [18] also leverage the Intel MPK and
memory protection extensions (MPX) to isolate the
shadow stack. Our efforts to provide an OS abstraction
for in-process memory protection is orthogonal but more
general than these studies, which all have potential use
cases for µTiles. Our focus has also been on lowering the
resource cost to work well on embedded and IoT devices,
while these projects are also currently x86-only.
HiStar [51] is a DIFC-based OS that supports fine-
grained in-process address space isolation. It influenced
our work, but we focused on providing a more general-
purpose solution for small devices by basing our work on
the Linux kernel instead of a custom operating system.
Other DIFC-based systems only support per-process pro-
tection with very large overhead [32, 49] or need specific
programming language support [43].
Compiler & Language Runtime: Various compiler
techniques introduce memory isolation as part of a
memory-safe programming language. These approaches
are fine-grained and efficient if the checks can be done
statically [23]. However, such isolation is language-
specific, relies on the compiler and runtime, and not ef-
fective when applications are co-linked with libraries
written in unsafe languages and libraries. µTiles abstrac-
tions are fine-grained enough to be useful to these tools,
for example, to isolate unsafe bindings.
Software fault isolation (SFI) [44, 48] uses runtime
memory access checks inserted by the compiler or by
rewriting binaries to provide memory isolation in un-
safe languages with substantial overhead. Bounds checks
impose overhead on the execution of all components
(even untrusted ones), and additional overhead is required
to prevent control-flow hijacks, which could bypass the
bounds checks [31]. ARMLock [54] is an SFI-based so-
lution that offers lower overhead utilizing ARM memory
domains.Similarly, Shreds [19] provides new program-
ming primitives for in-process private memory support.
µTiles also uses ARM memory domains for improving
the performance of intra-process memory protection, but
is a more flexible solution for intra-process privilege sep-
aration; it provides a new threading model for dynamic
fine-grained access control over the address space with
no dependency on a binary rewriter, specific compiler or
programming language (See Table 2).
Hardware-enforced techniques: A wide range of sys-
tems use hardware enclaves such as Intel’s SGX [7] or
ARM’s TrustZone [8] to provide a trusted execution en-
vironment for applications that against malicious kernel
or hypervisor [12, 25, 26].
The trust model exposed by these hardware features is
very fixed, and usually results in porting monolithic code-
bases to execute within the enclaves. EnclaveDom [38]
utilizes Intel MPK to provide in-enclave privilege separa-
tion. µTiles provide better performance and more general
solutions with no dependency on these hardware fea-
tures; hence it can be used for in-enclave isolation and
secure multi-threading to improves both security and
11
performance of enclave-assisted applications.
Ultimately, dedicated hardware support for tagged
memory and capabilities (e.g., ARM MTE [9]) would be
the ideal platform to run µTiles on [52]. We are planning
on building this support as future work, with a view to
analyzing if the overall increase in hardware complex-
ity offsets the resource usage in software for embedded
systems.
8 Conclusions
We have presented µTiles – an OS abstraction, a set of
security primitives and APIs for protecting data objects
inside a shared address space, and providing flexible priv-
ileged separation for multithreaded applications. We de-
signed µTiles to be extremely lightweight for IoT appli-
cations, with no programming language requirements,
and with a small performance overhead by utilizing effi-
cient hardware-based memory protection that makes it
practical for a variety of uses cases and security-sensitive
applications.
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